Should the Treble Damages Provision of RICO be Revisited by Congress? by Blecki, Douglas Richard
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
4-1-1990
Should the Treble Damages Provision of RICO be
Revisited by Congress?
Douglas Richard Blecki
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas Richard Blecki, Should the Treble Damages Provision of RICO be Revisited by Congress?, 1 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 49 (2014)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol1/iss1/4
Should the Treble Damages Provision of
RICO be Revisited by Congress?
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................... 49
II. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE RICO STATUTE ................... 50
A. Defining the Elements of a RICO Violation ..................... 50
B. Increased Utilization of RICO in Civil Actions and Criminal
Prosecutions ................................................. 51
III. HAS THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GONE TO
FAR? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 55
IV. CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION ........................................... 58
A. Legislative Purpose of RICO .................................. 58
B. Modification of the Treble Damages Provision ................... 59
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 60
"It does not require any one to be long in a court before he discov-
ers how many things brought there ought to have been settled else-
where or never laid hold of anywhere "I
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to combat the encroachment of
organized crime upon legitimate business organizations.2 To
achieve this end, the statute was drafted with intentionally broad
language,3 providing for a variety of criminal sanctions and civil
remedies. 4 The civil remedies include a provision for treble dam-
ages to those injured by racketeering activity.5 While atilization of
RICO in civil cases lay dormant for many years, the 1980s have
witnessed a dramatic increase in civil RICO actions.6
1. C. EDWARDS, PLEASANTRIES ABOUT COURTS AND LAWYERS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 22 (1867).
2. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591-92 (1981) (citing S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969)).
3. Id
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
6. Many commentators have noted the increase in the utilization of RICO in civil
actions. See, eg., Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court takes
the Racketeering Requirement out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 823 n. 11 (1986)
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This Comment reevaluates the rationale of the treble damages
provision of RICO in view of its increased utilization in civil
actions. Section II provides the necessary background by focusing
on the prima facie elements of a RICO action. Section III exempli-
fies the dilemma created in holding civil and criminal actions to the
same statutory standard under RICO. Section IV suggests a possi-
ble legislative solution to curb the improper utilization of RICO,
especially in view of the original legislative purpose of the statute.
Finally, Section V concludes by proposing that the frivolous use of
civil RICO can be controlled by modifying the treble damages pro-
vision of the statute.
II. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE RICO STATUTE
A. Defining the Elements of a RICO Violation
A thorough analysis of the elements of a RICO violation
requires an examination of both the statute and its interpretation by
the courts. First, with reference to the statutory language, 18
U.S.C. § 1962 specifically prohibits four types of conduct: 1) it is
unlawful to receive income derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity and to subsequently invest this income in an enterprise
which impacts interstate or foreign commerce;7 2) it is unlawful to
acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of, any enterprise
which impacts interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity;' 3) it is unlawful for a person employed by or
associated with any enterprise which impacts interstate or foreign
commerce to conduct or participate in the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; 9 and 4) it is unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions.10
("Over 100 decisions have been published concerning private civil RICO actions since
1978.") (citing A RICO Crisis - 2nd Circuit Rulings Sharply Curb Civil Actions" Lawyers
See Confusion Until the High Court Acts, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 31 col. 1). "In
contrast, courts published only two decisions concerning private civil RICO during the first
seven years of RICO's existence". Id. at 823 n. I1 (citing Long, Treble Damages for
Violations of the Securities Law" A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil
Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201, 206 n.32 (1981)).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989).
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The federal courts have interpreted the foregoing operative
provisions to require the following prima facie elements as a prereq-
uisite to bringing an action under RICO: "1) That a person; 2)
employ a pattern of racketeering activity; 3) so as to affect an inter-
state enterprise; 4) in one or more or the ways prohibited under
title 18 United States Code section 1962; 5) which causes injury to
the plaintiff's business or property."" The elements required to
bring a criminal or civil action are the same, except that a civil
action requires the additional element of damages.
Holding both criminal and civil prosecutions to the same stat-
utory standard presents a serious dilemma: Should RICO be
applied broadly to hinder the growth of organized crime, or should
it be applied narrowly to protect the interests of business and com-
merce?' 2 The gravamen of the RICO dilemma, however, does not
lie in the prima facie elements established by the courts as prerequi-
sites to bringing a RICO action or in the operative provisions of the
statute. Rather, the dilemma lies in the fact that both civil and
criminal actions are based on the same statutory language; lan-
guage which the judiciary has interpreted broadly.' 3 The discus-
sion that follows suggests that judicial interpretation of the
foregoing statutory terms has led to a dramatic increase in the utili-
zation of the RICO statute, especially in the civil context.
B. Increased Utilization of RICO in Civil Actions
and Criminal Prosecutions
In the past decade, the RICO statute has been applied to an
increasing number of scenarios.'" Many commentators suggest
11. Lieberman, A Primer on RICO, 53 INTER ALIA 3, F-I. See also Utz v. Correa, 631
F. Supp. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
12. See generally Comment, Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-
Enterprise Rule Under RICO, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179 (1988) (proposing that the
corporation be held liable under the tort doctrine of respondeat superior); Comment,
Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of
Vicarious Corporate Liability 65 B. U. L. REV. 561, 606 (1985) ("Holding a corporation
liable under RICO's treble damages provision based solely on vicarious liability is an
unjustified expansion of civil RICO.").
13. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Bonanno, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (where the federal
government was held not to be a person under RICO and, thus, not have standing to seek
treble damages). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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that this increased utilization of RICO is necessary in order to
arrest the growth of organized crime."5 This Comment, while
agreeing with this premise, maintains that RICO has been extended
to circumstances which Congress may not have anticipated RICO
to apply. 16
An examination of RICO case law indicates that in most
instances the judiciary has liberally construed the language of the
statute.' 7 For instance, the language: "pattern of racketeering
activity" has invariably received broad judicial interpretation. In
Blake v. Dierdorff,'8 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that a "pattern of racketeering activity" could consist of as
little as two separate acts." Moreover, in Smith v. Cooper,20 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "racketeering
acts" need not be in connection with one another and that two
related acts were sufficient to constitute a pattern under RICO.2
Furthermore, in United States v. Bagaric,22 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated that the object of racketeering activity
must not necessarily be profit oriented.23 In Bagaric, an organiza-
tion motivated by political goals, rather than financial profits, was
found to be under the purview of RICO.24
The term "person" has also been liberally construed by the
courts. For instance, in United States v. Elliot 25 , the Court of
15. See Blakey, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious
Technology Center v. Wollershein" Will Civil RICO Be Effective Against White-Collar
Crime?, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 592-95 (1987).
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra note 55 and accompanying
text.
17. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. Cf Californian Architectural Building
Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987) (where the court
rejected the defendant's theory that twenty separate acts of mail and wire fraud constituted
a single episode). As most business is conducted by wire and mail, the use of mail and wire
fraud as predicate acts extends the scope of RICO. See, eg., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western
Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1354 (3d Cir. 1987) (RICO applies to "garden
variety fraud").
18. 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988).
19. Ia at 1368.
20. 846 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1988).
21. I at 326-29.
22. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
23. Id at 53.
24. I,
25. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the term "person"
extended to individuals who were either inside or outside the enter-
prise as long as they participated in the affairs of the enterprise.26
Other courts have gone as far as finding that, even in the absence of
allegations that the "person" is in anyway connected with organ-
ized crime, dismissal of the RICO charges is not required. 7 In
essence, the common thread of analysis running through the cases
dealing with the definition of the term "person" is the relationship
of the defendant to the enterprise, rather than whether the defend-
ant(s) are in effect "persons" under the RICO statute.2"
Not all decisions, however, have served to broaden the scope
of RICO. In United States v. Mandel,29 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland examined the issue of whether
the State of Maryland could meet the "enterprise" requirement of
RICO. The court stated:
It is simply untenable to argue that Congress, without saying so,
intended to federalize crimes involving acts of a public official in
conducting the government of a state. In the absence of clear
Congressional intent, courts traditionally should be reluctant to
give a broad construction to a criminal statute which would
transform matters primarily of local concern into federal
felonies.3°
The facts and procedural history of Mandel provide further
insight into the interrelationship of the predicate acts of RICO and
the elements of a RICO claim. In Mandel, the Governor of Mary-
land and his co-defendants were initially convicted of fifteen counts
26. Id. at 903.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976),
convictions vacated on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'd original
convictions, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980),
vacated, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) (granting defendant's writ of error), aff'd, 862
F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988).
28. The term "enterprise" has also been construed broadly, perhaps further inviting
the use of civil RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578-587 (1981)
(stating that Congress adopted a broad interpretation of the word "enterprise" when it
enacted the RICO statute). See also United States v. Amione, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d Cir.
1983) (where the "enterprise" element was plead as an association in fact).
29. 415 F. Supp. at 997.
30. Id. at 1021. But see United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1979) (holding that the term "enterprise" can be either a public or
private concern).
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of mail fraud and one count of a RICO violation as a result of
accepting gifts in exchange for their support of certain race track
legislation.3 ' The RICO conviction, however, was based on the
activities of the defendants in a securities firm, not with their activi-
ties connected with the State of Maryland.32
Nevertheless, the underlying predicate acts of the RICO viola-
tion involved mail fraud and were based on the defendants
defrauding the citizens of Maryland of their "right to have [their]
Government conducted honestly and impartially."33In 1987, how-
ever, the Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States34 that the
mail fraud statute only protects property rights, not the intangible
rights of citizenry to good government.35 Based on McNally, the
Mandel defendants moved the court for a writ of error to vacate
their earlier convictions, arguing that McNally reversed the predi-
cate acts on which their RICO convictions were based.36 The Dis-
trict Court granted their motion, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision. 7
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how the elements of a
RICO claim are inextricably connected to the underlying predicate
acts of the case. All requirements must, therefore, be present in
order to prevail in a RICO action.38 Cognizance of this phenomena
by the judiciary can help ensure the proper application of the
RICO statute, can help preserve scarce judicial resources, and can
help ensure that the intended social policy goals behind the statute
are reached.39
31. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1352.
32. Id. at 1353.
33. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1070.
34. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
35. Id. at 2879.
36. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. at 866.
37. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1072-74.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1988) (where the
indictment was held insufficient since it didn't state that the business enterprise affected
interstate commerce).
39. Prior to the inclusion of treble damages in title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act, the policy objectives of the "Civil Approach" to RICO were presented in Senate
Report Number 91-617:
As a special committee of the American Bar Association observed: "The
time-tested machinery of the antitrust laws contains several useful and
workable features which are appropriate for use against organized crime."
[Vol. 1:49
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III. HAS THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT GONE TO FAR?
In United States v. Hartley,4" the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit extended the scope of RICO4 by holding that a
corporation may be "simultaneously both a defendant and the
enterprise under RICO [18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)]." '42 Previously, the
judiciary had interpreted the language of § 1962(c) to require that
the "person" charged and the "enterprise" be distinct from one
another.4 3 The Hartley decision has not been followed by the bal-
ance of the circuit courts. To date, only in the Eleventh Circuit
can a RICO defendant pattern racketeering activity on its self
under § 1962(c). 4 The facts and procedural posture of Hartley
provide an adequate starting point of analysis for this novel appli-
cation of RICO.
In Hartley, the "enterprise," Treasure Isle, Inc., had a con-
tract with the Government to provide the United States Military
Title IX thus brings to bear on the infiltration of organized crime into
legitimate business or other organizations the full panoply of civil remedies,
including a civil investigative demand, now available in the antitrust area.
The use of such remedies as prohibitory injunctions and the issuing of orders
of divestment or dissolution is explicitly authorized. Nevertheless, it must be
emphasized that these remedies are not exclusive, and that title IX seeks
essentially an economic, not a punitive goal
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1969) (emphasis added).
40. 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
41. The decision broadens the scope of RICO in both civil actions and criminal
prosecutions because it brings the defendant corporation's assets directly under the fine,
forfeiture, treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees provisions of the RICO
statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
42. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988.
43. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988 (finding that a corporation could be both the enterprise
and defendant in a RICO claim); but see United States v. Computer Science Corp., 689
F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1982) (" 'Enterprise' was meant to refer to a being different
from, not the same, or part of, the 'person' whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit
and failing that to punish."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Hirsch v. Enright. 751
F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1989) ("the 'person' must be associated with a separate 'enterprise'
[under § 1962(c)] . . . the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is the only appellate
court that has come to a different conclusion"); Harco v. American Nat. B. & T. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[a corporation] may not be held liable under
section 1962(c) for conducting its own affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity").
The Harco opinion also concluded that the person and enterprise could be the same entity
under § 1962(a). The language of § 1962(a) does not contemplate separate entities as does
the language of § 1962(c), e.g. "employed by" and "associated with."
44. Hirsch v. Enright, 751 F.2d at 633.
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with frozen breaded shrimp.45 The "persons," charged under
RICO were G. Cecil Hartley, Vice-President, Travis Dell, Plant
Manager and the "enterprise," Treasure Isle, Inc.46 The predicate
acts for the RICO charges consisted of various schemes to defraud
the government, including the switching of government inspection
tags on the shrimp and the preparation of special non-representa-
tive sample lots for government inspection.47
The defendants were convicted and subsequently appealed to
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing,
inter alia, that it was the intent of Congress that the "persons"
charged under § 1962(c) and the "enterprise" be separate and dis-
tinct from each other.48 Their argument was based on the language
of the operative provisions of RICO which in general make it
unlawful for "persons" to engage in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity which affects an interstate "enterprise." 49 Stated differently, the
defendants argued that, under the operative provisions of RICO,
the "enterprise" could not possibly pattern racketeering activity on
its self. The court rejected this argument and upheld all of the
convictions.
A careful examination of the opinion, however, indicates that
the court failed to directly address the issues raised by the defend-
ants. Specifically, the opinion of the court offered no substantial
legal support for its decision that an "enterprise" can pattern activ-
ity on its self.50 Instead, the decision relied on a broad reading of
the term "enterprise" given by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Turkette.s' The court summed up the remainder of its rationale
by stating that "it would defy reason to suggest that the central
figure (the enterprise) could not also be prosecuted under RICO."
5 2
Hartley is in direct conflict with the precedent set by the bal-
ance of the circuits.5 3 More significantly, the decision, perhaps
45. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 965.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 966-67.
48. Id at 988.
49. Id
50. Id at 988-90.
51. 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
52. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 989.
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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unjustifiably, exposes the assets of a corporation to the drastic
remedial provisions of RICO, including treble damages, fine and
forfeiture, and reasonable attorneys' fees."4 The remainder of this
Comment will suggest, among other things, that Congress intended
that such strong weapons be utilized only against organized crime
and not against persons or enterprises that one would be hard-
pressed to classify as organized criminals, especially for alleged vio-
lations of predicate acts that one would be hard-pressed to consider
as racketeering activities."
Although it appears that the Hartley court went to far in
extending the scope of RICO, the decision does serve to illustrate
the RICO dilemma,5 6 i.e., a broad interpretation of RICO provides
a potent weapon and deterrent against organized crime. It also
helps protect the interests of those who are legitimately injured by
racketeering activities. On the other hand, a broad interpretation
of RICO may backfire, and expose RICO defendants to unusually
severe, if not insurmountable, burdens.57
Presently, the only remedy to a frivolous civil RICO action is
54. Hartley has been followed within the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., Outlet
Communications v. King World Productions, 685, F. Supp. 1570, 1578-90 (M.D. Fla.
1988) ("The Eleventh Circuit has held in the criminal context that a corporation may be a
defendant and enterprise under RICO, and this has been recognized in civil RICO cases
within this circuit.") (emphasis added). See also United States v. Romano 730 F.2d 1432,
1440-41 (11th Cir. 1984); Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v.
Touche Ross & Co., 603 F. Supp. 351, 354 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Hartley was also followed
recently in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. See
MHC, Inc. v. International United Mine Workers, 685 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. Ky. 1988)
(finding that the "enterprise" element had been sufficiently plead when union picketers
were both the enterprise and the defendants).
55. Cf Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 371 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(upholding the dismissal of a state RICO action against a business competitor), aff'd, 858
F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988).
56. The RICO dilemma can be attributed to three interrelated factors: i) Civil actions
and criminal prosecutions have been based on the same statutory standard. See Harco v.
American Nat. B. & T. Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984). 2) RICO was
designed to encourage civil actions. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 80-83. 3)
Civil claims and criminal prosecutions have different standards of proof. See United States
v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that the standard of proof in civil
proceedings is lower than it is in criminal prosecutions), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
57. Criminal forfeiture provisions can also pose a heavy burden on a RICO defendant.
See Winnick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel
of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765
(1989) (demonstrating how the forfeiture provision can deny a RICO defendant a proper
defense of the action).
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for the defendant to seek costs and sanctions under Rule Eleven of
the Federal Rules of Federal Procedure." This remedy is drasti-
cally inadequate in two (public policy) respects: First, it forces the
victim of an ill-motivated claim to seek relief when that defendant
should not have had to face the time and expense of trial in the first
place. Second, damage awards are traditionally made toward the
conclusion of litigation. The cost of defending a RICO action can
be substantial.59 Even if the defendant prevails in the action and in
a motion for costs, he must still survive financially until he is
reimbursed.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
A. Legislative Purpose of RICO
In order to ascertain the legislative purpose of RICO, it is nec-
essary to examine the congressional debates which preceded the
enactment of RICO. Before examining these debates, it is perhaps
prudent to reflect on the political scenario which existed at that
time. By 1970, the year that RICO was enacted, proponents of the
statute portrayed organized crime as centrally controlled mobs
gaining financial strength, not only through traditional criminal
activity such as gambling and extortion, but also through infiltra-
tion of legitimate business organizations. 6" In effect, the nation-
wide concern over organized crime had reached such proportions
that it was believed that the viability of the free enterprise system
was at stake. Senate Report number 617 which was published dur-
ing the first session of the 91st Congress reflects this concern:
It must be frankly recognized, moreover, that the infiltra-
tion of legitimate organizations by organized crime presents
more than a problem in the administration of criminal justice.
What is ultimately at stake is not only the security of individuals
and their property, but also the viability of our free enterprise
system.61
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
59. Winnick, supra. note 57 at 772-75.
60. See generally 116 CoNG. REc. 581-607 (1970); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 79-81 (1969).
61. Id. at 80-81.
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The extreme concern of Congress with organized crime was
perhaps attributable to the political touting of the Act by its propo-
nents; members of Congress vehemently spoke out against organ-
ized crime.62 A firm stance against the "evil" of organized crime
provided a strong political platform.
This political scenario indicates that the primary intention of
Congress in passing RICO was to combat "mafia-like" criminals
and not legitimate, non-organized crime, businesses which were
already subject to other penal statutes and common law actions.
Various remarks by Senator McClellan of Arkansas are illustrative
of this purpose:
I believe that every member of the Senate want[s] to enact
whatever legislation is necessary to strengthen the arm of the
law and law enforcement in this country so that society may be
protected; the impositions of organized criminals will not be
placed on our people, and the streets of our communities may at
least be made comparatively safe again someday.63
Unfortunately, there is no conclusive evidence within the legis-
lative history as to whether Congress intended the "enterprise" and
"person" elements be one and the same under § 1962(c). The
foregoing Senate reports clearly indicate that the primary target
which RICO was intended to combat was organized crime. It is,
therefore, unlikely that Congress anticipated that the judiciary
would attempt to extend the scope of the statute to business enter-
prises, other than traditional organized crime concerns, by such
mechanisms as employed by the Eleventh Circuit in Hartley, espe-
cially when congressional deliberations characterized the enterprise
as the victim which should be protected from the evils of organized
crime.64
B. Modification of the Treble Damages Provision
Congress has left two conflicting influences to guide the Judici-
ary in its interpretation of RICO: On the one hand, RICO should
62. 116 CONG. REC. at 584.
63. Id. at 584 (opening remarks of Senator McClellan referring to the entire Organized
Crime Control Act; Title XI of this Act was the original RICO statute).
64. Id. at 586.
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be interpreted broadly in order to be a strong and effective weapon
in criminal prosecutions. On the other hand, the statute should not
be so liberally construed as to thwart legitimate, non-organized
crime, enterprises through frivolous civil actions as these entities
are already subject to, among other things, common law actions for
fraud should they injure a civil plaintiff. A possible solution for
reconciling these conflicting influences would be for Congress to
apply the treble damages clause65 only to cases involving extreme
racketeering activity.
66
By eliminating the automatic application of the treble damages
clause, the motivation of civil plaintiffs with questionable claims
would be reduced and the primary purpose behind the statute, to
combat organized crime, would be attained. Frivolous civil
claims under RICO6 would sharply diminish as the possibility of
receiving treble damages would not be gleaming so brightly on the
horizon. More importantly, the effectiveness of RICO against
organized crime would increase because this modification would
relieve the criminal justice system from civil considerations in
applying RICO more broadly. Other purposes of civil RICO, e.g.,
a supplemental policing function and compensation to truly injured
parties, would remain intact as the courts could award treble dam-
ages in extreme cases of racketeering activity.
V. CONCLUSION
After examining the current problems facing RICO and the
65. The treble damages clause was not included in the text of title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act when read into the Congressional Record. 116 CONG. REC. 581-82
(1970). Congress patterned RICO after the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
(1982). Like RICO, the antitrust statute has been the vehicle of questionable civil actions.
See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1354 (1986) (where
antitrust actions were brought alleging a conspiracy to charge higher than market prices,
which violate the Sherman Act per se but could not possibly injure the plaintiff).
66. Other possible alternatives to the RICO dilemma include: 1) following decisions
like Hartley which broaden the applicability of RICO, 2) not following decisions like
Hartley, 3) eliminating civil remedies altogether, and/or 4) holding civil actions to a higher
standard of proof than criminal actions. Each of these alternatives tends to serve only one
interest and fails to adequately address the RICO dilemma.
67. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 1, 79, 80-81 (1969) (presenting the
purpose and the justification for the "Civil Approach" of RICO); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961
History; Statement of Findings and Purpose (Law Co-op. 1979).
68. See supra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
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legislative purpose behind the statute, this Comment suggests that
the real issue is not whether to broadly or narrowly interpret RICO
or whether to eliminate the statute altogether. Instead, the issue is
how to apply RICO broadly without creating adverse effects on
individuals, commerce, and the judicial system. As a possible solu-
tion to this issue, this Comment suggests that the treble damages
provisions of RICO be modified so as to be available only in the
most extreme situations.
This solution would preserve judicial resources without sacri-
ficing the rights of truly injured individuals. It would not only
reduce the incentive to bring frivolous claims, but it would also
allow courts to award treble damages, at their discretion, to truly
injured- parties. Moreover, the .original purpose of RICO, i.e., to
provide law enforcement officials with a potent and far reaching
weapon to eliminate organized crime,69 would be preserved since
the judicial system would be freed from the burden of civil consid-
erations when applying RICO broadly in criminal actions. In sum,
by eliminating the automatic application of the treble damages pro-
vision, not only would RICO become a more potent medicine
against the illness of organized crime, but concern over civil side
effects would also be substantially reduced.
DOUGLAS RICHARD BLECKI
69. See supra notes 2 and 67 and accompanying text.

